William Fallon: the Arnstein litigation behind a misplaced Chicago visit
William Fallon had a documented courtroom assignment in 1920 that differed from the role later attached to him in the Black Sox investigation. The Supreme Court's published decisions name him as counsel for Arnstein in litigation over compulsory testimony and imprisonment for contempt. The newspaper-based reconstruction by baseball legal historian Bill Lamb places him in a Manhattan criminal courtroom on October 26, when Arnold Rothstein was meeting White Sox counsel in Chicago. Those were different proceedings involving different clients and lawyers.
In his SABR correction of Eight Men Out, Lamb identifies the Manhattan judge as Joseph F. Mulqueen and the business as a request to postpone the Arnstein conspiracy and war-bonds robbery trial. Fallon opposed postponement. Lamb cites the October 26, 1920 Evening World, New York Herald and New York Tribune. He also distinguishes the lawyers handling Rothstein's Chicago appearance: Meier Steinbrink conducted negotiations for his voluntary testimony, while Hyman Turchin accompanied him to the meeting with Alfred Austrian. Lamb bases the latter identification on contemporary coverage and Austrian's later civil-trial testimony. The precise Manhattan date rests on that later reconstruction of newspaper coverage; it is not a finding in the Supreme Court's bankruptcy decisions.
The federal record establishes William Fallon's actual representation of Arnstein independently of that reconstruction. Arndstein v. McCarthy, reported at 254 U.S. 71, lists Fallon and Rufus S. Day for the appellant. It records argument on October 21–22, 1920 and a decision on November 8. The spelling Arndstein appears in the case title. The dispute arose after an involuntary bankruptcy examination. Arnstein refused numerous inquiries because his responses could incriminate him. A district judge initially accepted that position and declined to punish him for contempt. The situation changed after he submitted sworn schedules of assets and liabilities under the court's direction.
The lower court treated those schedules as a waiver of the privilege and jailed him when he continued to refuse further disclosures. Justice McReynolds's opinion rejected that reasoning. Filing the schedules, without an admission of guilt or other clearly incriminating disclosure, did not automatically end the privilege. The Court also considered the Bankruptcy Act's protection against using the testimony itself in a criminal proceeding. That provision did not prevent investigators from using testimony to discover other evidence. The distinction between direct use and investigative consequences mattered to whether compulsory testimony remained dangerous to the witness.
A separate memorandum dated December 20, 1920 limited the procedural effect of that victory. In the decision reported at 254 U.S. 379, the Court explained that its mandate required the district court to issue the habeas corpus writ and continue through the ordinary proceedings. If proper reasons for continued detention existed beyond those disclosed in Arnstein's petition, they could be presented in the marshal's return. This was litigation over the legal basis for confinement, with further proceedings still possible.
The dispute returned in 1923, again with William Fallon named as Arnstein's lawyer. The fuller history in McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, records an initial refusal to respond to 447 inquiries. After the schedules were filed, the judge ordered responses to 426 of them. The schedules disclosed an $18,000 bank deposit. The marshal later argued that earlier oral testimony had waived the privilege. The Court rejected an automatic waiver from non-incriminating denials or partial disclosures. It upheld the order releasing Arnstein from the contempt confinement, rather than deciding whether he had committed the underlying alleged crimes.
That 1923 opinion also addressed an attempt to challenge the good faith of Arnstein's refusals. The Court said those grounds had not been set out in the marshal's return or decided below. It declined to examine the lengthy interrogation afresh on appeal. Its discussion noted that many repeated inquiries appeared less connected to discovering bankruptcy assets than to gathering evidence for a state grand-larceny charge. The constitutional dispute therefore had practical consequences across proceedings: disclosures demanded in one forum could expose a person to prosecution in another.
On rehearing, the 1924 decision at 266 U.S. 34 again lists Fallon for Arnstein. Justice Brandeis rejected the government's broad contention that the privilege against self-incrimination did not apply in civil proceedings. It protected witnesses wherever their testimony could expose them to criminal responsibility, including a witness who was not a defendant. But the Court distinguished testimony from surrendering property belonging to the bankruptcy estate. The privilege did not allow retention of business books and papers that had to be handed over. William Fallon's documented case thus involved a precise boundary between compelled speech and property obligations, not a general exemption from legal process.
- Bill Lamb, Society for American Baseball Research: Appendix of errors in Eight Men Out, items 49–50 — sabr.org
- U.S. Supreme Court, Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920), text at Cornell Legal Information Institute — www.law.cornell.edu
- U.S. Supreme Court, Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 379 (1920), supplemental memorandum at Cornell LII — www.law.cornell.edu
- U.S. Supreme Court, McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355 (1923), text at Cornell LII — www.law.cornell.edu
- U.S. Supreme Court, McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924), rehearing opinion at Cornell LII — www.law.cornell.edu